United States District Court Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

November 16, 2016 David J. Bradley, Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, | § | |
|---------------------------|---|---------------|
| Plaintiff/Respondent, | § | |
| | § | |
| V. | § | 2:15-CR-314-1 |
| | § | (2:16-CV-232) |
| JHONY BARRIOS-ANDRADE, | § | |
| Defendant/Movant. | § | |

ORDER DISMISSING MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 AND ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Jhony Barrios-Andrade (Barrios-Andrade) filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. D.E. 39. The Court has reviewed the motion and concludes that summary dismissal is appropriate because "it plainly appears from the motion . . . and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief. . . ." Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts (2016) (2255 Rules).

I. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. BACKGROUND

Barrios-Andrade pleaded guilty to illegal reentry before a federal Magistrate Judge in May 2015 after his arrest in March 2015. D.E. 12, 14. The district court accepted Barrios-

Andrade's guilty plea based on the unobjected to recommendation of the federal Magistrate Judge. D.E. 15.

A Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) was prepared. D.E. 17. The base level offense for Illegal Reentry is 8. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a). *Id.*, ¶ 12. His offense level was enhanced by 16 based upon his prior felony conviction for solicitation to commit possession of narcotic drugs for sale in Arizona in 2008. *Id.*, ¶ 13. After credit for acceptance of responsibility, his total offense level was 21. *Id.*, ¶ 21. Barrios-Andrade had several previous convictions resulting in ten criminal history points and a criminal history category of V. *Id.*, ¶¶ 23-29. His guideline range of imprisonment was calculated to be 70 to 87 months. *Id.*, ¶ 49.

At sentencing, the Court considered Barrios-Andrade's criminal history, including the 2003 solicitation of possession which occurred when Barrios-Andrade was 21 years old. He now is married, has three children, and has no convictions after 2007. The Court sentenced Barrios-Andrade to 36 months imprisonment, two years supervised release, no fine, and a \$100 special assessment. D.E. 20. The Court advised him of his right to appeal. Barrios-Andrade appealed, but his appeal was dismissed as frivolous on February 26, 2016. *United States v. Barrios-Andrade*, No. 15-41069 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2016). The present motion was mailed on June 14, 2016. It is timely.

III. MOVANT'S ALLEGATIONS

Barrios-Andrade challenges the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) as unconstitutionally vague pursuant to *Johnson v. United States*, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). He seeks resentencing without the enhancement.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255

There are four cognizable grounds upon which a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence: 1) constitutional issues, 2) challenges to the district court's jurisdiction to impose the sentence, 3) challenges to the length of a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, and 4) claims that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; *United States v. Placente*, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." *United States v. Vaughn*, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992).

B. Johnson Claim

Johnson held that the residual clause of the definition of violent felony was unconstitutionally vague in the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Act defines "violent felony" as follows:

any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

§ 924(e)(2)(B).

The closing words of this definition, italicized above, have come to be known as the Act's residual clause.

Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2555-56 (emphasis added).

Barrios-Andrade's offense level was enhanced pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i)¹ for drug trafficking based upon his Arizona conviction,² not a crime of violence. *Johnson* has no application. *See* D.E. 15, ¶ 12. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit rejected application of the *Johnson* holding to § 16(b). *United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria*, 831 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after--

Id. (emphasis added).

¹ (b) Specific Offense Characteristic

⁽¹⁾ Apply the Greatest:

⁽A) a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of violence; (iii) a firearms offense; (iv) a child pornography offense; (v) a national security or terrorism offense; (vi) a human trafficking offense; or (vii) an alien smuggling offense, increase by 16 levels if the conviction receives criminal history points under Chapter Four or by 12 levels if the conviction does not receive criminal history points

² At sentencing, the Court relied upon *United States v. Meija-Andrade*, 572 Fed. App'x. 233 (5th Cir. July 8, 2014) which held that the Arizona crime of solicitation to possess a narcotic drug for sale constituted a drug trafficking offense as defined in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i).

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding "unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Although Barrios-Andrade has not yet filed a notice of appeal, the § 2255 Rules instruct this Court to "issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." Rule 11, § 2255 RULES.

A COA "may issue. . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "The COA determination under § 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits." *Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

To warrant a grant of the certificate as to claims denied on their merits, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). This standard requires a § 2255 movant to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether the motion should have been resolved differently, or that the issues presented deserved encouragement to proceed further. *United States v. Jones*, 287 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (relying upon *Slack*, 529 U.S. at 483-84).

As to claims that the district court rejects solely on procedural grounds, the movant must show both that "jurists of reasons would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right *and* that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack, 529 U.S. at

484 (emphasis added).

Based on the above standards, the Court concludes that Barrios-Andrade is not entitled to a COA on any of his claims. That is, reasonable jurists could not debate the Court's resolution of his claims, nor do these issues deserve encouragement to proceed.

See Jones, 287 F.3d at 329.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Barrios-Andrade's motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (D.E. 39; Cause No. 2:16-CV-232, D.E. 1) and DENIES him a Certificate of Appealability.

Ordered this 15th day of November 2016.

HAYDEN/HEAD

SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE